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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff7Appellee : 
JACK JAMES TRANE : Case No. 990886-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated section 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 
78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) which grants this Court authority to review appeals in criminal 
cases not involving a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the police may 
search a person based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is presently 
armed and dangerous. The police had no such suspicion below, and, instead, immediately 
searched the defendant without inquiring into the circumstances of the defendant's 
detention. Did the police violate the defendant's right to be free from illegal searches? 
In determining whether the police conducted an illegal search, this Court upholds 
the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous but reviews the ultimate 
determination of reasonable suspicion for correctness. State v. White. 856 P.2d 656, 659 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). This issue is preserved at R. 47; 166: 66-67.1 
2 A. Utah Code Annotated section 76-9-305 (1999) criminalizes refusing to follow 
a "lawful" police order. The police ordered the defendant to submit to a search even 
though they lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was armed and dangerous. 
Did the trial court err in concluding that the police had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant for disobeying an illegal request for a search? 
This Court reviews the interpretation of a statute for correctness. State v. Cox. 826 
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). This issue is preserved at R. 47-48, 70-71. 
2B. A person commits the crime of intoxication when that person is under the 
influence of a substance "to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (1999). The police unequivocally testified that the 
defendant posed no safety risk to himself or others. Did the trial court err in concluding 
that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant for intoxication? 
In determining whether the police had probable cause to arrest a person, this Court 
Volume marked "166" contains the transcript of the suppression hearing. The 
internal page numbers of that volume are listed after "R. 166." 
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reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and the probable cause conclusion 
for correctness. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994). This issue is preserved at 
R. 46-48; 166: 63-65, 69. 
2C. The State contended that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendant 
for disorderly conduct. That crime prohibits persons from making unreasonable noise 
with the intent to inconvenience, annoy or alarm others. Did the defendant commit that 
offense when he was ffa little loud" at 4:00 a.m. outside a convenience store located at a 
major intersection surrounded by businesses. 
In reviewing whether the police had probable cause to arrest a person, this Court 
evaluates the trial court's factual findings for clear error and the probable cause 
conclusion for correctness. Poole. 871 P.2d at 533. This issue is preserved at R. 46-48; 
166: 63, 67-68. 
2D. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if reasonable persons cannot discern its 
meaning, it grants the police unfettered discretion to enforce it, or it inhibits protected 
speech. A statute is unconstitutionally overbroad if it prohibits constitutionally protected 
activities in addition to the targeted conduct. The disorderly conduct statute's ban against 
making "unreasonable noise" with the intent to cause "inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm" causes reasonable persons to guess at the meaning of those phrases, provides the 
police no guidelines, and proscribes protected speech. Is the disorderly conduct statute 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad? 
3 
This Court reviews a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute for correctness. 
Provo City v. Whatcott. 2000 UT App. 86, f 5, 391 Utah Adv. Rep. 22. This issue is 
preserved at R. 166: 68-69. 
3. To deter the police from conducting illegal searches and seizures, courts must 
suppress illegally obtained evidence unless intervening circumstances dissipate the 
unlawful conduct. In this case, the defendant's resistance was directly related to the 
flagrant violation of his right to be free from illegal searches. Did the trial court correctly 
conclude that the defendant's resistance did not constitute an intervening, independent 
basis for arresting him? 
In reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, this Court 
upholds the trial court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous but reviews the 
ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion for correctness. State v. White. 856 P.2d 
656, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This issue is preserved at R. 166: 71-76. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution similarly protects persons from 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person 
or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-8-305 (1999) bars persons from disobeying 
lawful police orders: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to 
refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest or 
detention. 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-9-701(1) (1999) defines the crime of intoxication 
5 
as follows: 
A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the 
influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance 
having the property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that 
the person may endanger himself or another, in a public place or 
in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons. 
Under Utah Code Annotated section 76-9-102(1) (1999), a person commits the 
crime of disorderly conduct under the following circumstances: 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act which 
serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, 
or threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State filed an information on November 30, 1998, charging Mr. Trane with 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, intoxication, and interfering with a peace 
officer making a lawful arrest. R. 17. On February 5, 1999, Mr. Trane filed a motion to 
suppress a rock of cocaine the police found on him during the search following his arrest. 
R. 42. Mr. Trane contended that the police initially lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop 
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and search him and subsequently lacked probable cause to arrest him. R. 46-48. The 
State opposed the motion. R 52. 
On March 2, 1999, the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion. R. 166. The 
hearing judge ruled that the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity and that Mr. Trane was armed and dangerous. R. 166: 82-84. The judge also 
concluded that the police lawfully arrested Mr. Trane for intoxication and for disobeying 
a lawful order to submit to a search. R. 166: 84-85. She did agree with the defense that 
Mr. Trane's physical resistance to his arrest did not constitute an independent crime. R. 
166: 85. 
On April 26, 1999, Mr. Trane filed an opposition to the State's proposed findings 
and conclusions. R. 92. Although the record does not include the State's proposal, Mr. 
Trane's court filings indicate that the State did not accurately reflect the hearing judge's 
oral decision that Mr. Trane's resistance did not constitute an independent basis for 
arresting him. R. 95, 105-06. The hearing judge agreed and adopted Mr. Trane's 
proposed findings and conclusions. R. 110. 
On June 21, 1999, Mr. Trane pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of 
a controlled substance. R. 109, 114. As part of the agreement, Mr. Trane reserved his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. R. 119. 
On September 13, 1999, the trial court sentenced Mr. Trane to a term of up to five 
years in the Utah State Prison. R. 123. The sentencing judge ordered Mr. Trane to pay a 
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fine of $1387.50 and to pay $200.00 toward the costs of his court-appointed attorney. R. 
124. The sentencing judge suspended Mr. Trane's prison term and placed him on 
probation for 36 months with the condition that Mr. Trane enroll in an in-patient 
treatment program for alcohol and drugs. R. 123-25. This appeal followed. R. 126. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At 4:15 a.m. on November 26, 1998, Salt Lake City Police Officer Randy 
Bushman received a dispatch call that a man was either "harassing" or "hassling" 
customers and a clerk at a convenience store on the comer of 700 East and 2700 South. 
R. 166: 5-6, 34. Upon arrival, Officer Bushman saw Mr. Trane standing outside the store 
near a bank of public telephones. R. 166: 6. The convenience store parking lot was 
well-lit. R. 166: 49. Two other businesses with lit parking lots were located on two of 
the other three corners. R. 166: 49. Nibley Park golf course sits on the fourth comer. 
As Officer Bushman approached the store, the store clerk pointed at Mr. Trane 
from inside the store, apparently indicating Mr. Trane as the source of the complaint. R. 
166: 6. As Officer Bushman approached Mr. Trane, he smelled a strong alcohol odor and 
determined that Mr. Trane was intoxicated. R. 166: 7. Mr. Trane informed Officer 
Bushman that he was angry at the store clerk for refusing to telephone a taxi for him. R. 
166: 7-8. Although Mr. Trane was loud and he used profanity, he did not threaten anyone 
nor did he make any aggressive movements. R. 166: 7-8, 18-19. 
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Officer Bushman requested Mr. Trane's identification but Mr. Trane refused to 
comply. R. 166: 9. When Officer Bushman stated that Mr. Trane was required to 
identify himself, Mr. Trane presented a Utah identification card. R. 166: 9. Officer 
Bushman attempted to take the card from Mr. Trane, but Mr. Trane held it and would not 
let go. R. 166: 9. After ordering Mr. Trane to release the card, Mr. Trane loosened his 
grip. R. 166:9,21. 
About the time Officer Bushman obtained the card, Officer Walter Dobrowolski 
arrived. R. 166: 9, 34. Officer Bushman asked Officer Dobrowolski to watch Mr. Trane 
while he checked Mr. Trane's identification for warrants. R. 166: 34-35, 48. The only 
other information he provided Officer Dobrowolski was his statement that Mr. Trane was 
"trying to talk his way into jail." R. 166:48. Officer Dobrowolski asked Officer 
Bushman if he had searched Mr. Trane for weapons to which Officer Bushman responded 
negatively. R. 166: 35. Officer Bushman then walked toward his car to conduct a 
computer search. R. 166: 11. 
Without any inquiry, Officer Dobrowolski immediately ordered Mr. Trane to turn 
around, place his hands behind his head, and to submit to a weapons frisk. R. 166: 35. 
Mr. Trane stepped backward, held his hands up with his palms facing the officer, and 
said, "[t]hat ain't happening." R. 166: 36, 51-52. After Mr. Trane refused a second 
command to submit to a search, Officer Dobrowolski announced that he would arrest Mr. 
Trane for refusing to obey the demand for a search. R. 166: 36-38. 
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Officer Bushman overheard the exchange and returned to assist Officer 
Dobrowolski with the arrest. R. 166: 11. Each officer grabbed an arm and tried to 
restrain Mr. Trane. R. 166: 12. Mr. Trane resisted the restraint "with some struggle and 
some thrashing1' but he did not attempt to strike the police officers. R. 166: 12, 29, 39. 
The struggle moved 10 to 12 feet from the bank of telephones into 2700 South. R. 166: 
12. The officers forced Mr. Trane to the pavement and attempted to subdue him. R. 166: 
12. Mr. Trane then grabbed at Officer Dobrowolski a couple of times with an open hand 
which prompted Officer Bushman to punch Mr. Trane in the ribs and the face. R. 166: 
15, 29. Officer Dobrowolski also hit Mr. Trane when Mr. Trane tried to put his hand 
underneath his body and to roll towards Officer Dobrowolski. R. 166: 53-54. Mr. Trane 
relented after Officer Dobrowolski sprayed him with pepper spray. R. 166: 13. 
A motorist saw the struggle and offered to help but the officers declined the 
invitation. R. 166: 13. The police officers then summoned an ambulance to remove the 
pepper spray from Mr. Trane's eyes. R. 166: 14. After medical personnel treated Mr. 
Trane at the scene, the police officers transported him to the jail. R. 166: 41-42. 
At the jail, Mr. Trane continued to refuse to cooperate. R. 166: 45-46. He did not 
throw any punches or direct any violence toward the booking officer; he simply resisted 
the attempt to search him. R. 166: 45-46. Eventually, several correctional officers had to 
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restrain Mr. Trane due to his yelling and struggling. R. 165: 21;2166: 42. Mr. Trane 
kicked at one officer when the officer grabbed his leg and tried to remove his shoe. R. 
165: 21. When the officer eventually succeeded in removing Mr. Trane's shoe and sock, 
he found a small bindle of cocaine. R. 165: 21. 
The State charged Mr. Trane with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, 
intoxication, and interfering with a peace officer making a lawful arrest. R. 17. 
Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound over Mr. Trane on all of the 
charges. R. 165: 23. 
Mr. Trane challenged the bind over in a motion to suppress. R. 42. He contended 
that the police officers lacked the necessary reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
seize him, the police exceeded the scope of the seizure, Officer Dobrowolski lacked a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Trane was armed and dangerous to justify a search, and 
probable cause did not support the arrest. R. 46-48. Based on his claim that the police 
violated his right to be free from illegal searches and seizures, Mr. Trane argued that 
federal constitution required the trial court to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of these 
illegalities. R. 48-49. 
The State opposed the motion to suppress and argued that the police had a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Trane had committed the crimes of disorderly conduct and 
2Volume 165 contains the preliminary hearing transcript. The internal page 
numbers of that volume are listed after "R. 165.,f 
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intoxication. R. 54. Concerning the scope of the seizure, the State contended that the 
police have authority to check for outstanding warrants when stopping persons based on a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. R. 54-55. The State asserted further that 
Officer Dobrowolski properly ordered Mr. Trane to submit to a search because he had a 
reasonable suspicion that Mr. Trane was armed and dangerous. R. 55-56. As justification 
to arrest Mr. Trane, the State claimed that the police had probable cause that Mr. Trane 
had committed the crimes of interfering with a peace officer and disorderly conduct. R. 
56-57. Finally, the State argued that Mr. Trane's resistance to his arrest constituted a new 
and distinct crime. R. 57-60. 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Bushman testified that when he 
approached Mr. Trane he noticed that Mr. Trane "was a little loud considering the time, 
the location.1' R. 166: 7. Although Officer Bushman alleged that Mr. Trane engaged in 
"tumultuous-type behavior," he clarified on cross-examination that this description 
applied only to Mr. Trane's "verbal[]ff expressions. R. 166: 7-8, 26. 
Officers Bushman and Dobrowolski testified that in their experience intoxicated 
persons commonly exhibit violent, unpredictable and unsafe behavior. R. 166: 4-5, 32-
33. In this case, however, Officer Bushman admitted that Mr. Trane did not pose a safety 
risk to himself or to others. R. 166: 22. He also conceded that Mr. Trane never 
threatened anyone nor took any threatening actions. R. 166: 18-22, 25-26. Although 
Officer Bushman felt that Mr. Trane may have committed the crimes of intoxication or 
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disorderly conduct, he did not arrest Mr. Trane for either of those offenses. R. 166: 8-9. 
Officer Bushman initially claimed that Mr. Trane assumed a "boxing" or "fighting" 
stance and that he made threatening gestures, but he clarified on cross-examination that 
Mr. Trane did not clench his fists nor place his arms in a fighting position. R. 166: 7-8, 
19-20. Rather, he simply used his arms and hands to express himself. R. 166: 8, 19-20. 
He explained that he alerted Officer Dobrowolski that Mr. Trane was trying to talk 
himself into jail for "safety reasons" so that Officer Dobrowolski did not blindly enter the 
situation. R. 166: 10-11. 
Officer Dobrowolski similarly conceded that Mr. Trane exhibited no threatening or 
aggressive behavior prior to his ordering Mr. Trane to submit to a weapons search. R. 
166: 50. Although he initially asserted that Mr. Trane was "belligerent" and 
uncooperative, he admitted on cross-examination that, from his brief observations, Mr. 
Trane appeared to be cooperating with Officer Bushman. R. 166:48-50. As Officer 
Dobrowolski testified at testified at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Trane posed no danger 
to himself and he did not appear to threaten anyone else. R. 165: 14-15. 
In fact, Officer Dobrowolski acknowledged that he did not know what had 
transpired between Officer Bushman and Mr. Trane before his arrival. Instead, he 
ordered Mr. Trane to submit to a search based on "just a little bit of information." R. 166: 
40. Specifically, Officer Dobrowolski explained that he based his decision to search Mr. 
Trane only on the radio report of a man "hassling" people at a convenience store, Officer 
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Bushman's statement that Mr. Trane was "trying to talk himself into jail," and the fact 
that although Mr. Trane appeared to be cooperating with Officer Bushman he was 
intoxicated. R. 166: 48-49. In fact, he indicated at the preliminary hearing, that he 
sought to search Mr. Trane based on "a measure of precaution [rather] than actual 
suspicion." R. 165: 13.3 
Mr. Trane responded by refusing to be searched, stepping or leaning backwards 
and raising his arms with the palms of his hands facing the officer. R. 166: 36. Officer 
Dobrowolski testified that he interpreted this conduct as indicating that Mr. Trane may 
have possessed "something he didn't want me to find that could hurt" him R. 166: 36, 51. 
Defense counsel argued, in addition to the arguments raised in the motion to 
suppress, that an arrest for disorderly conduct violated Mr. Trane's free speech rights 
because the police arrested Mr. Trane based only on his verbal expressions, not his 
conduct. R. 166: 68. In support of this argument, counsel noted that in Logan Citv v. 
Huber, 786 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court invalidated an ordinance similar 
to the disorderly conduct statute as violative of the First Amendment. 
The hearing judge ruled that the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion that 
Mr. Trane had committed some criminal act based on the radio report and Mr. Trane's 
intoxication, loud cursing, and fighting stance. R. 166: 82. She also ruled that the 
3Defense counsel actually stated the quoted language in the form of a question, to 
which Officer Dobrwolski replied that defense counsel had "[e]xactly" characterized his 
motives in seeking to search Mr. Trane. 
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encounter did not last long enough to even question the scope of the seizure. R. 166: 83. 
As for Officer Dobrowolski's demand for a weapons search, the judge concluded that the 
radio report, Mr. Trane's intoxication, his lack of cooperation, his angry and 
uncooperative demeanor, Officer Bushman's vague statement, the late hour, and Officer 
Dobrowolski's experience with intoxicated persons, justified Officer Dobrowolski's 
concern. R. 166: 83-84. Thus, the police properly arrested Mr. Trane for disobeying a 
lawful command to submit to a search. R. 166: 84-85. 
The judge further ruled that the police had probable cause or "close to probable 
cause" to arrest him for intoxication. R. 166: 85. She also concluded that Mr. Trane's 
resistance to his arrest did not constitute a distinct crime "because there was already a 
lawful arrest " R. 166: 85. The judge did not address the constitutionality of the 
disorderly conduct statute nor did she decide whether the police had probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Trane under that provision. 
Mr. Trane ultimately pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance in exchange for the dismissal of the intoxication and interfering 
charges. R. 109, 114. He also reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. R. 119. 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Trane on the drug charge to a term of up to five years 
in the Utah State Prison. R. 123. The court also ordered Mr. Trane to pay a fine of 
$1387.50 and to pay $200.00 toward the costs of his court-appointed attorney. R. 124. In 
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lieu of incarceration, the trial court suspended Mr. Trane's prison term and placed him on 
probation for 36 months with the condition that he enroll in an in-patient treatment 
program for alcohol and drugs. R. 123-25. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Officer Dobrowolski lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Trane was 
armed and presently dangerous when he ordered Mr. Trane to submit to a search. In 
denying the motion to suppress, the trial court erred in considering Officer Bushman's 
interaction with Mr. Trane. Those dealings played no role in Officer Dobrowolski's 
unilateral decision to search Mr. Trane. Officer Dobrowolski's limited knowledge 
provided no basis for immediately deciding to search Mr. Trane. Rather, the Fourth 
Amendment required him to conduct a reasonable inquiry before demanding a search. 
Even considering Officer Bushman's observations, the police lacked a reasonable 
suspicion to search Mr. Trane. Officer Bushman's decision not to search Mr. Trane, after 
having personally dealt with him, confirms that the police lacked grounds for a search. 
The police also lacked authority to search Mr. Trane incident to an arrest. The 
police lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Trane for interfering with a police officer 
because Officer Dobrowolski lacked a "lawful" basis for searching Mr. Trane. The State 
erred in claiming that case law supports an arrest under the interfering statute. Contrary 
to this case, the police in those cases had a "lawful" basis for an arrest. Moreover, 
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Officers Bushman and Dobrowolski could not have legally arrested Mr. Trane for 
intoxication because they conceded that he did not pose a danger to himself or others. 
The evidence similarly fails to support an arrest for disorderly conduct. The only 
possible manner in which Mr. Trane committed that crime would be if he made 
unreasonable noises with the intent to inconvenience, annoy, or alarm others. Officer 
Bushman's testimony that Mr. Trane was "a little loud" outside a convenience store 
located at a busy intersection fails to constitute probable cause of a crime. Officer 
Bushman's failure to arrest Mr. Trane establishes that the police lacked probable cause 
for disorderly conduct. 
Even if the police had probable cause to arrest Mr. Trane for that crime, the statute 
defining disorderly conduct is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. That statute's ban 
against making "unreasonable noise" with the intent to cause "inconvenience, annoyance, 
or alarm" fails to warn reasonable persons of prohibited conduct, gives the police 
unrestrained power to arrest, and inhibits protected speech. 
The trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Trane's resistance did not provide an 
independent basis for arresting and searching him. When the police illegally search a 
person, courts must suppress the fruits of the search to deter future illegal police conduct. 
But, if suppression has little deterrent value, courts will not exclude illegally obtained 
evidence. Given Officer Dobrowolski's flagrant violation of Mr. Trane's Fourth 
Amendment rights and the fact that Mr. Trane's resistance directly responded to the 
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illegal police conduct, suppression has significant deterrent value. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE POLICE LACKED A REASONABLE SUSPICION 
THAT MR. TRANE WAS ARMED AND PRESENTLY 
DANGEROUS WHEN THE ARRESTING POLICE 
OFFICER ORDERED MR. TRANE TO SUBMIT TO A 
SEARCH IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ARRIVAL 
W I T H O U T ANY I N Q U I R Y I N T O THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE DETENTION 
Officer Dobrowolski lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Trane was 
armed and dangerous as a prerequisite to ordering him to submit to a search. Admittedly, 
the police likely had sufficient suspicion of criminal activity to stop and question Mr. 
Trane. But, Mr. Trane gave no indication that he had a weapon and planned to use it. 
Although the trial judge erred in considering the events that occurred prior to Officer 
Dobrowolski's arrival, those facts fail to supply the necessary safety concerns to allow the 
police to search Mr. Trane. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution as applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment bars the police from conducting "unreasonable searches and 
seizures." U.S. Const. Amends. IV, XIV. The Utah Constitution provides similar 
protection. Utah Const, art. I, § 14. Even when the police have a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity, these constitutional provisions bar the police from searching a suspect 
unless a separate factual basis supports a reasonable suspicion that a suspect is armed and 
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poses a danger. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized, "f[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more 
carefully guarded . . . than the right of every individual to the possession and control of 
his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and 
unquestionable authority of law.1" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union 
Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
To safeguard this right, the Terry court carefully delineated the circumstances 
under which the police may search a suspect for weapons: 
[WJhere a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads 
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom 
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in 
the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as 
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing 
in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his 
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for 
the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a 
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in 
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault 
him. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (emphasis added). A suspicion that a person poses a danger is not 
reasonable if based on no more than a "'hunch.'" Id at 27. Rather, it must be based on 
specific "articulable" facts. Id at 21; State v. Scholsser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 
1989). 
In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court erroneously considered Mr. 
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Trane's demeanor and conduct prior to Officer Dobrowolski's arrival. When reviewing 
the denial of a motion to suppress the fruits of a search, this Court upholds the trial 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous but reviews the ultimate 
determination of reasonable suspicion for correctness. White. 856 P.2d at 659. In this 
case, Officer Dobrowolski based his decision to search Mr. Trane on "just a little bit of 
information," none of which included Officer Bushman's observations of Mr. Trane's 
demeanor. Officer Dobrowolski conceded that his only knowledge involved the radio 
report of a man "hassling" or "harassing" persons at a convenience store, Officer 
Bushman's statement that Mr. Trane "was trying to talk himself into jail," and Mr. 
Trane's apparent intoxication. Thus, Officer's Bushman's observations of Mr. Trane's 
demeanor played no role in Officer Dobrowolski's decision to search Mr. Trane. 
Officer Dobrowolski's limited knowledge was wholly inadequate upon which to 
base a search. In fact, his brief observations demonstrated that Mr. Trane posed no 
danger. Officer Dobrowolski admitted that when he arrived Mr. Trane appeared to be 
cooperating with Officer Bushman. R. 166: 48-50. He had no indication that Mr. Trane 
was angry or had threatened any violence. If anything, Officer Bushman's statement to 
Officer Dobrowolski that he had not searched Mr. Trane indicated that Officer Bushman 
perceived no safety risk. 
Instead of forming a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Trane was armed and 
dangerous, Officer Dobrowolski made a snap decision not to tolerate any lack of 
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cooperation. Officer Dobrowolski concluded from Officer Bushman's statement that Mr. 
Trane "was trying to talk himself into jail" that Mr. Trane was trouble. He then 
immediately asked if Officer Bushman had conducted a weapons search. This inquiry 
reveals that once Officer Dobrowolski learned that Mr. Trane was intoxicated and had 
agitated Officer Bushman in some unspecified way, he decided to search Mr. Trane 
regardless of whether a basis existed to do so. 
Officer Bushman's vague assessment of Mr. Trane's attitude did not indicate or 
even imply that Mr. Trane was "armed and dangerous." Officer Dobrowolski simply 
disliked Mr. Trane. Rather than searching based on a reasonable suspicion of weapons, 
Officer Dobrowolski revealed his true motives when he admitted at the preliminary 
hearing that he decided to search Mr. Trane based only on "precaution [rather] than actual 
suspicion." R. 165: 13. This decision was more akin to a hunch rather than a reasonable 
articulable suspicion of a danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27; Scholsser, 774 P.2d at 1137. 
Officer Dobrowolski similarly attempted to conduct an illegal search by failing to 
investigate whether Mr. Trane was armed and dangerous. Under Terry, a police officer 
must "identify] himself as a policeman and make[] reasonable inquiries . . . [to attempt] 
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others1 safety" before searching for weapons. 
392 U.S. at 30. Officer Dobrowolski made no such inquiries. He neither inquired with 
the store clerk about the complaints nor did he ask Officer Bushman about the 
circumstances of the detention. Instead, he rashly decided to search Mr. Trane. 
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This Court has indicated that the police may dispense with the inquiry 
requirement when they have reliable information that the suspect poses a danger. White. 
856 P.2d at 659 (citing Adams v. Williams. 407 U.S. 143 (1972)). In the absence of such 
information, the police must inquire when "questioning can be safely undertaken to 
substantiate or dispel suspicions." Id. at 663. As Officer Bushman's dealings with Mr. 
Trane establish, Officer Dobrowolski could have safely questioned Mr. Trane rather than 
immediately attempting to search him. 
Bven if the trial court properly factored in Officer Bushman's observations, those 
facts failed to establish a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Mr. Trane was armed and 
dangerous. Although Mr. Trane was angry with the store clerk and had allegedly 
harassed others, the store clerk did not report any threats or violent conduct. The absence 
of any reported violence or threats toward the clerk-the target of Mr. Trane's anger-
indicates, if anything, that Mr. Trane was not armed or dangerous. 
Although Mr. Trane was angry and he used profanity, he made no threats to 
Officers Bushman or Dobrowolski. Moreover, Officer Bushman conceded at the 
suppression hearing that he perceived no threat to his safety. He also backtracked on his 
claim that Mr. Trane assumed a fighting stance and explained, instead that Mr. Trane 
merely waved his arms with open hands while expressing himself. R. 166: 19-20. Thus, 
the trial court's written finding that Mr. Trane assumed a "fighting stance" was clearly 
erroneous. R. 111. 
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Perhaps most telling, Officer Bushman, who personally dealt with Mr. Trane, 
apparently did not perceive Mr. Trane as a danger. Officer Bushman stated that he 
alerted Officer Dobrowolski to Mr. Trane's attitude for "safety reasons,11 and, yet, this 
warning included no concerns or precautions that Mr. Trane posed a safety risk. Had Mr. 
Trane truly posed a risk, Officer Bushman surely would have searched Mr. Trane himself 
or he would have provided more specific details in handing over the situation to Officer 
Dobrowolski. 
Finally, Mr. Trane's step backward when he refused to be searched provided no 
basis for searching Mr. Trane. First, this movement occurred after, not before, Officer 
Dobrowolski ordered Mr. Trane to submit to a search. Thus, it did not provide a 
reasonable suspicion for the initial decision to order a search. Second, stepping backward 
with arms raised in a stop signal and refusing to be searched did not reasonably cause 
Officer Dobrowolski to "wonder[] if [Mr. Trane] had something he didn't want me to find 
that could hurt me." R. 166: 36. Mr. Trane's step back appears to be a defensive action 
rather than a threat of violence or aggression. At best, Officer Dobrowolski's "wonder" 
was a hunch. 
Because under no scenario did the police have a reasonable suspicion that Mr. 
Trane was both "armed and presently dangerous," the police illegally searched him based 
on that premise. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
23 
n. THE POLICE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED MR, TRANE 
INCIDENT TO AN ARREST BECAUSE HE COULD NOT 
HAVE VIOLATED THE INTERFERING STATUTE FOR 
DISOBEYING AN UNLAWFUL ORDER AND BECAUSE 
THE POLICE ADMITTED THAT THEY LACKED 
PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE CRIME OF 
INTOXICATION 
The police also lacked grounds to search Mr. Trane incident to an arrest. Because 
the police lacked a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Trane was armed and dangerous, they 
did not legally order him to submit to a search. Thus, the police lacked probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Trane for refusing to follow a "lawful" police order. There was also no basis 
for arresting Mr. Trane for intoxication since both Officer Dobrowolski and Officer 
Bushman acknowledged that Mr. Trane posed no safety risk to himself or to others. 
A. Because Officer Dobrowolski lacked a 
reasonable suspicion for a search, Mr. Trane 
did not disobey a "lawful" order and, thus, the 
police lacked probable cause to arrest him for 
interfering with a peace officer 
The trial court erred in concluding that Officer Dobrowolski legally searched Mr. 
Trane incident to an arrest for refusing to comply with a lawful order to submit to a 
search. Under Utah Code Annotated section 76-8-305 (the "interfering statute"), persons 
may not interfere with a "lawful arrest or detention" by refusing to perform a "lawful 
order" by the police. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2) (1999). Mr. Trane committed no 
crime under the plain language of that statute because Officer Dobrowolski's command to 
24 
submit to a search was not a "lawful order." 
This Court reviews the interpretation of a statute for correctness. State v. Cox. 826 
P.2d 656, 662 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In reviewing statutes, this Court interprets them by 
utilizing the plain meaning of their words. Id. The interfering statute only prohibits 
persons from disobeying a "lawful order." By implication, that statute does not 
criminalize the refusal to follow an illegal police order. Any other interpretation ignores 
the plain language of the statute and would render the phrase "lawful order" superfluous. 
Because Officer Dobrowolski lacked a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Trane was 
armed and dangerous, he did not "lawfully]" order Mr. Trane to submit to a search. 
Thus, Mr. Trane's refusal to comply with the unlawful order did not constitute a crime 
and Officer Dobrowolski lacked authority to search Mr. Trane incident to an arrest for 
interfering. 
The State, relying on State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), and its progeny, 
argued below that Mr. Trane's refusal to submit to a search provided a "valid" basis for 
arresting him. R. 57. The State misapplied the Gardiner line of cases. In Gardiner, the 
Utah Supreme Court discussed the common law right to "forcibly resist" an illegal arrest. 
IdL at 571. Although the Court doubted the remaining viability of that right, it declined to 
address whether such a right exists in Utah because the legislature abolished all common 
law crimes and defenses when it enacted the criminal code in 1973. IdL (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-105 (1973)). Rather, "[n]ow, in Utah a person is guilty of a crime only if 
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that person's actions and state of mind fit within the statutory definitional elements of a 
crime." Id. Following Gardiner, "any right to resist arrest must stem from the statute in 
question." Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 10039 1010 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Under the plain statutory definition of the interfering statute, Mr. Trane's refusal to 
submit to an illegal search did not constitute a crime. Contrary to the State's claims, 
because Officer Dobrowolski lacked grounds for a search, Mr. Trane did not disobey a 
"lawful order." 
Further, the facts of Gardiner and its progeny are distinguishable. The defendants 
in Gardiner. Smoot. and State v. Griego. 933 P.2d 1003 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), had all 
unquestionably violated the interference statute for resisting a lawful arrest. In Gardiner, 
the defendant interfered with the police after they lawfully arrested him for assaulting a 
police officer. 814 P.2d at 575. In Smoot. the defendant attempted to flee after the police 
arrested him based on an outstanding arrest warrant. 921 P.2d at 1011-12. And, finally, 
the defendant in Griego assaulted police officers and attempted to flee after the police had 
lawfully arrested him for disorderly conduct. 933 P.2d at 1009. 
In this case, Officer Dobrowolski had no "lawful" basis for ordering Mr. Trane to 
submit to a search. Mr. Trane's refusal to comply with an illegal order did not implicate 
the interference statute. 
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B. The police admitted that they lacked probable 
cause for the crime of intoxication 
Because the police similarly lacked probable cause to arrest Mr. Trane for 
intoxication, he did not violate the interference statute for refusing to be searched incident 
to an arrest for that crime. In determining whether the police had probable cause to arrest 
a person, this Court reviews the trial court's factual findings for clear error and the 
probable cause conclusion for correctness. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 
1994). Again, the trial court erroneously considered Officer Bushman's dealings with 
Mr. Trane in concluding that "Officer Dobrowolski had, if not probable cause, then close 
to probable cause" to arrest Mr. Trane for intoxication. Officer Dobrowolski had no 
knowledge of those dealings. Officer Bushman's observations simply played no role in 
Officer Dobrowolski's decision to search or arrest Mr. Trane. 
Officer Dobrowolski's limited knowledge provided no basis for arresting Mr. 
Trane for intoxication. To constitute the crime of intoxication, a person must be under 
the influence of a substance "to a degree that the person may endanger himself or 
another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701(1) (1999). Officer Dobrowolski testified at the 
preliminary hearing that Mr. Trane posed no danger to himself and that he did not appear 
to threaten anyone else. R. 165: 14-15. And, although Officer Dobrowolski noted at the 
suppression hearing that he regularly encountered intoxicated persons who posed safety 
risks, he identified no evidence to cause him any concern for Mr. Trane's or any other 
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person's safety. R. 166: 32-33. 
Even if the trial court properly considered Officer Bushman's observations of Mr. 
Trane, probable cause was lacking. Officer Bushman unequivocally testified that nothing 
about Mr. Trane's actions "created a risk of harm to himself... [or] to anybody else." R. 
166: 22.4 The fact that Officer Bushman did not attempt to search or arrest Mr. Trane 
confirms that he did not regard Mr. Trane as a safety risk. 
Because the police had no "lawful" basis for arresting Mr. Trane for intoxication, 
he could not have violated the interference statute for refusing to be searched incident to 
an arrest for that crime. The police, accordingly, lacked authority to search him incident 
to that arrest. 
C. The police lacked probable cause to arrest Mr, 
Trane for being unreasonably loud 
Although the trial court did not address the legality of an arrest for disorderly 
conduct, the police lacked probable cause for that crime. Mr. Trane's conduct fell within 
none of the acts prohibited under the disorderly conduct statute. 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-9-102(1) (1999) defines the circumstances under 
which a person commits the crime of disorderly conduct: 
4This quoted language is taken from defense counsel's cross-examination of 
Officer Bushman. In particular, defense counsel asked Officer Bushman if he had 
observed any specific conduct showing that Mr. Trane posed a risk of danger, to which 
Officer Bushman responded, MNo.,f R. 166: 22. 
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(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) he refuses to comply with the lawful order of the 
police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a 
hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act which 
serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) intending to cause public inconvenience, 
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he: 
(i) engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, 
or threatening behavior; 
(ii) makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
(iii) makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.5 
The only provision having any possible application to this case involves the 
making of unreasonable noises in a public place with the intent to inconvenience, annoy 
5Section 11.12.020 of the Salt Lake City Municipal Code similarly defines the 
crime of disturbing the peace: 
A. A person is guilty of disturbing the peace if such person: 
1. Refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police 
to move from a public place; 
2. Knowingly creates a hazardous condition; 
3. Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance 
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
a. Engages in fighting, violent, tumultuous or 
threatening behavior, 
b. Uses words that are intended to cause acts of 
violence by the person to whom the words are addressed, 
c. Makes unreasonable noises in a private place 
which can be heard in a public place, 
d. Maliciously or wilfully disturbs the peace or quiet of 
another or of any public place by making unreasonably loud noise or by 
discharging firearms, or 
e. Obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic, except 
as allowed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 3.50. 
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or alarm another. Specifically, the police did not order Mr. Trane to "move from a public 
place" and Mr. Trane did not create a hazardous or physically offensive condition. 
Although Officer Bushman claimed that Mr. Trane engaged in "tumultuous-type 
behavior," he conceded that he based this characterization solely on Mr. Trane's verbal 
conduct. Moreover, both police officers readily conceded that Mr. Trane was not violent 
or threatening in any way. And, the fact that the struggle ended up in the street did not 
amount to a crime because Mr. Trane did not voluntarily enter the street to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. These facts leave only the noise prohibition as 
possible grounds for arresting him. 
The circumstances of Mr. Trane's detention demonstrate that the police lacked 
probable cause that he made "unreasonable noises in a public place." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-9-102(l)(b)(ii) (1999). Other than Officer Bushman's general claims that Mr. Trane 
was loud and tumultuous, the only specific evidence addressing his noise level was 
Officer Bushman's testimony that Mr. Trane was "a little loud considering the time, the 
location." R. 166: 7. This vague assessment provides flimsy support for finding probable 
cause for an arrest. The convenience store is located on the corner of a major traffic 
intersection on 700 East, one of the busiest highways in Salt Lake County. Businesses 
dot three corners. A reasonable level of noise at that location, even late at night, appears 
to be elevated. 
Moreover, no evidence indicates that Mr. Trane's noise level bothered anyone. 
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The radio report communicated that Mr. Trane was "hassling" people not that he was 
unreasonably loud. There was no indication that any neighbors heard Mr. Trane's 
speaking or that he could be heard over traffic. The evidence merely indicates that Mr. 
Trane was "a little loud." 
Again, Officer Bushman's conduct proves telling. Despite Mr. Trane's alleged 
loudness, Officer Bushman did not arrest him for disorderly conduct. Apparently, he 
considered Mr. Trane's noise level acceptable enough to leave him while he checked for 
outstanding warrants. This handling of the situation hardly comports with disorderly 
conduct. 
D. The disorderly conduct statute is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad 
Even if probable cause supported an arrest for disorderly conduct, the statute 
defining that crime is unconstitutional on its face. This Court reviews a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute for correctness. Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App. 86, ^  
5, 391 Utah Adv. Rep. 22. A statute is unconstitutionally vague if it: (1) fails to provide a 
"person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited;" (2) 
"impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for 
resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application;" or (3) inhibits the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. 
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Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). 
The disorderly conduct statute's ban against intending to cause "inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm" violates these prohibitions. First, the statute fails to provide 
reasonable persons notice of prohibited conduct. The language "inconvenience, 
annoyance or alarm" is similar to one the United States Supreme Court invalidated in 
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). In that case, a city enacted an 
ordinance that barred three or more persons from congregating and "'annoying'" others. 
Id at 611. The Supreme Court ruled that this phrase was unconstitutionally vague 
because "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others." Id. at 614. Thus, 
under the ordinance "no standard of conduct is specified at all." Id. 
The same reasoning applies to the phrase "inconvenience, annoyance or alarm." 
Conduct that may be inconvenient, annoying or alarming to one person may not be to 
another. For example, petition gatherers for a citizen initiative or solicitors for the 
Salvation Army certainly annoy some people but inspire others. Additionally, the 
tendency to inconvenience, annoy, or alarm may depend on the time of day, the location, 
weather conditions, or the fact that someone may be in a hurry. The uncertainty over the 
meaning of these words requires people of "'common intelligence [ to] . . . guess at [their] 
meaning.'" Id (quoting Connallv v. General Construction Co.. 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). 
Second, the challenged phrase fails to provide the police, judges and juries 
minimal guidelines in applying the statute. In Logan City v. Huber, 786 P.2d 1372, 1376 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1990), this Court struck down as unconstitutionally vague an identical 
phrase in a city ordinance because it "conferred] virtually unrestrained power on police 
to arrest and charge persons with a violation." The phrase "inconvenience, annoyance or 
alarm" similarly fails to pass constitutional muster because it is "inherently subjective" 
and allows police officers to apply it at their whim. City of Chicago v. Morales. 527 U.S. 
41, , 119S.Ct. 1849, 1862(1999). 
The United States Supreme Court invalidated an equally subjective phrase for the 
same reason in Morales. That phrase allowed the police to disperse groups who gathered 
for "no apparent purpose." 119 S.Ct. at 1857. The Court ruled that those words granted 
the police unfettered discretion to assess a person's motives for gathering. Id. at 1861-62. 
Likewise, the phrase "inconvenience, annoyance or alarm" requires the police to 
speculate about a person's intent. 
The phrase "unreasonable noises" itself presents similar dangers. The disorderly 
conduct statute does not specify whether unreasonable noises are a subjective or objective 
determination. It, thus, allows the police to enforce it willy nilly. The statute further fails 
to grant law enforcement officers any guidance in determining what is an unreasonable 
noise. Instead, like the phrase no "apparent purpose," the disorderly conduct statute 
allows individual officers to decide what noises are unreasonable. Id. at 1861-62. The 
statute is, thus, distinguishable from the anti-noise ordinance upheld in Grayned v. City 
ofRockford. 408 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1972), that only outlawed noise that actually 
33 
disrupted normal school activities. 
Third, the uncertainty over the meaning of the phrases "inconvenience, annoyance 
or alarm" and "unreasonable noise" inevitably leads citizens "'to steer far wider of the 
unlawful zone' . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked." 
Baggett v.Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (quoting Speiser v. Randall. 357 U.S. 513, 
526 (1958)). This chilling effect applies with particular force to speech that tends to 
annoy or offend. As the Utah Supreme Court ruled in Huber: "Speech is often 
provocative and challenging.... [But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship and 
punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious 
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 786 
P.2d at 1377 n.ll (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago. 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). 
The disorderly conduct statute is also unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. "A 
statute will be invalidated for overbreadth only if i t . . . 'sweeps within its ambit other 
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of freedom of speech or the 
press.'" Provo City v. Whatcott 2000 UT App. 86, U 8, 391 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (quoting 
Huber, 786 P.2d at 1375). Penalizing persons for intending to inconvenience, annoy, or 
alarm others by noise or obstructing traffic, for example, seriously risks impinging on 
constitutionally protected activities. As with the vagueness challenge, petition gatherers 
for citizen initiatives or political rallies could be banned. As applied to this case, the 
police could chill dissatisfied customers at a store from expressing their views about poor 
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service or for being denied the use of a bathroom or a telephone. Thus, the statute 
inhibits legitimate activities. 
Given these free speech principles, the police lacked authority to arrest Mr. Trane 
for disorderly conduct and to search him incident to that arrest. 
III. THE NEED TO DETER THE POLICE FROM 
CONDUCTING ILLEGAL SEARCHES REQUIRES 
EXCLUDING THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE 
SEARCH 
The illegal police conduct required the trial court to exclude the fruits of Mr. 
Trane's arrest and subsequent search. Refusing to suppress the drugs found on Mr. Trane 
would encourage the police to search a person simply because the police do not like that 
person's attitude. In addition, Mr. Trane's resistance to the search and arrest did not 
dissipate the illegal police conduct. 
Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, courts must exclude evidence that 
"'has been come at by exploitation'" of illegal police conduct. Wong Sun v. United 
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (quoting Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959)). The 
purpose of the exclusionary rule "4is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional 
guaranty [against illegal searches] in the only effectively available way—by removing the 
incentive to disregard it.'" State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990) (quoting 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (I960)). Moreover, the rule also prevents 
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making courts a party to unlawful police conduct and it protects innocent persons from 
illegal searches and seizures. Id, at 689-90. 
But, suppression will not lie when such action would not deter illegal police 
conduct. State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263-64 (Utah 1993). Such circumstances 
exist, for example, when "the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and 
the discovery of the challenged evidence has 'become so attenuated as to dissipate the 
taint."' Wong Sun. 371 U.S. at 487 (quoting Nardone v. United States. 308 U.S. 338, 341 
(1939)). This Court found such a situation in State v. Griego. 933 P.2d 1003, 1008-09 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997), where the defendant committed "an intervening illegal act" by 
assaulting police officers and disturbing the peace. The State has the burden of showing 
attentuation. United States v. Bailev. 691 F.2d 1009, 1013 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, denied 
461 U.S. 933 (1983). 
The State contended below that Mr. Trane's refusal to be searched and his 
resistance to his arrest constituted a new crime that independently justified the police 
conduct. Although a separate criminal offense committed after illegal police conduct 
may, indeed, break the connection between the illegality and the discovery of evidence, a 
new crime, in itself, does not dissipate the illegal conduct. Rather, inquiries under the 
Fourth Amendment "'always should be conducted with the deterrent purpose of the . . . 
exclusionary rule sharply in focus.5" Thurman. 846 P.2d at 1263 (quoting Brown v. 
Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J. concurring)). Thus, an intervening act 
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nullifies the exclusionary rule only if "excluding the evidence will [not] effectively deter 
future illegalities." State v. Shoulderbalde. 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995); see Thurman. 
846 P.2d at 1263-64. New criminal acts are simply a factor in assessing the deterrent 
value of excluding illegally obtained evidence. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263-64. 
Appellate courts have recognized these principles, for example, in determining 
whether a confession or a consent to a search is sufficiently attenuated from illegal police 
conduct such that suppression would have any deterrent effect. These courts, in addition 
to considering the presence of an intervening criminal act, consider the purpose and 
flagrancy of the police misconduct, and the temporal proximity of the misconduct to the 
search. United States v. Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1996), reversed on other 
grounds 523 U.S. (1998); Shoulderbalde, 905 P.2d at 292. These factors have equal 
application to this case. 
First, the purpose and flagrancy of Officer Dobrowolski's decision to search Mr. 
Trane favors suppression. Officer Dobrowolski's snap decision to search Mr. Trane was 
an ffegregious[]lf violation of Mr. Trane's right to be free from illegal searches. Thurman. 
846 P.2d at 1264. Based on very limited information, Officer Dobrowolski hastily 
determined that he would not tolerate any mischief from Mr. Trane. Once he learned that 
Mr. Trane was intoxicated and had irritated Officer Bushman in some unspecified 
manner, he immediately determined not to put up with Mr. Trane even though he lacked 
any indication that Mr. Trane was armed and dangerous. 
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Officer Dobrowolski's conduct flagrantly disregarded the "'sacred... right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own person.1" Terry v. Ohio. 392 
U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford. 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)). 
Allowing the State to use the fruits of this illegal request to search would encourage the 
police to search persons anytime they dislike someone's attitude. The Terry Court 
established the reasonable suspicion requirement to prevent this very situation from 
occurring. Id. at 21. 
Although Officer Dobrowolski asserted that the purpose of the search was for 
safety reasons, his true motives appear less sincere. When, as here, the misconduct is 
"flagrantly abusive, there is a greater likelihood that the police engaged in the conduct as 
a pretext for collateral objectives." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1264. The record below 
supports this conclusion. Officer Dobrowolski admitted that Mr. Trane appeared to be 
cooperating with Officer Bushman when he ordered the search. Similarly, he conceded 
that he sought to search out of "precaution" rather than any "actual" suspicion that Mr. 
Trane was armed and dangerous. R. 165: 14. Moreover, knowing that Officer Bushman 
did not perceive a safety risk, he immediately decided to search Mr. Trane upon arrival. 
Given his lack of safety concerns, Officer Dobrowolski's purpose in searching Mr. Trane 
appears to relate more to his intolerance rather than a genuine concern for safety. 
Suppression is needed to deter such misconduct. 
Second, Mr. Trane's refusal to be searched and his resistance to his arrest did not 
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constitute an intervening act that would dispel the deterrent value of exclusion. To 
attenuate illegal police conduct, intervening acts must constitute ,Ka new, distinct crime" 
rather than simply Mreveal[] a crime that already has been or is being committed." State v. 
Wagstaff. 846 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (quoting United States v. Bailev. 
691 F.2d 1009, 1017 (11th Cir. 1982), cert, denied 461 U.S. 933 (1983) (emphasis in 
original)). As established above, Mr. Trane's refusal to obey an unlawful demand for a 
search did not constitute a crime. Further, although Mr. Trane resisted his arrest and 
search, his conduct was simply a continuation of the crime of interfering that the police 
already accused him of committing for failing to submit to a search. 
This Court has ruled that assaulting or fleeing from police may constitute new, 
distinct crimes. See Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003, 1011-12 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996); State v.Griego, 933 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). But, Mr. Trane's 
conduct did not rise to this level. Other than Mr. Trane's general resistance to the search, 
the only specific acts officers Bushman and Dobrowolski mentioned were Mr. Trane's 
attempt to grab at Officer Dobrowolski with an open hand and his attempt to roll toward 
him. Mr. Trane did not attempt to hit or injure anyone. This conduct hardly constitutes 
an assault or an attempt to flee. Rather, Mr. Trane's conduct merely indicates that he 
resisted an unlawful request to search him. 
Similarly, Mr. Trane's resistance at the jail did not constitute a new, distinct crime. 
Although several officers had to restrain Mr. Trane, Officer Dobrowolski conceded that 
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Mr. Trane did not strike the police, but simply resisted the attempt to search him. R. 166: 
46. The only act that even remotely approaches an assault was his kicking when an 
officer attempted to remove his shoe and sock. But, Officer Dobrowolski testified that 
this act was not a distinct assault directed at the officer; instead, it was simply a continued 
attempt to prevent the search. R. 166: 46. 
The trial court agreed that Mr. Trane's resistance did not constitute an independent 
crime because he resisted "after he was arrested11 for intoxication and interfering with the 
police. The trial court appears to have concluded that because the police had probable to 
arrest Mr. Trane, his resistance to his arrest was simply part of the process of detaining 
him.. 
Third, only the proximity factor appears to support attenuation but does so only 
marginally. Because Mr. Trane's resistance at the convenience store f!follow[ed] directly 
on the heels" of Officer Dobrowolski's illegal demand to search him, no temporal break 
occurred between the illegality and Mr. Trane's initial resistance. United States v. 
Ramirez, 91 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 1996), reversed on other grounds 523 U.S. 
(1998). A break did occur between the arrest at the store and Mr. Trane's resistance at 
the jail. But, as just discussed, Mr. Trane's resistance at the jail was simply a 
continuation of his resistance to the illegal police conduct. 
Despite the temporal break, the proximity factor provides minimal support for 
attenuation. As the Utah Supreme Court has noted, because the proximity factor fails to 
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recognize the relationship between the illegality, the defendant's response, and the 
deterrent effect of suppression, the proximity factor is the "least probative." 
Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d at 293. In contrast, the purpose and flagrancy factor "directly 
relates to the deterrent value of suppression" and strongly supports excluding the 
evidence. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993). The lack of intervening acts 
lends further support to suppressing the drugs found as a direct result of the illegal police 
conduct. In sum, the need to "deter future illegalities" requires excluding the fruits of the 
illegal search. Shoulderblade. 905 P.2d at 292. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Trane requests this Court to vacate the trial court's order denying the motion 
to suppress, to remand this matter to the trial court with instructions to enter an order 
granting the motion, and to allow Mr. Trane to withdraw his guilty plea. 
Dated this 2^o day of June, 2000. 
KEKT R. HART 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC*COURT 
SAEEiLAKE' COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MINUTES 
PlalnEiffJ r SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
vs. : Case No: 981923959'FS 
JACK JAMES TRANE^ : Judge: DENNIS MfFUCHS 
Defendants : Date: September^13, 1999 
PRESENT 
Clerk: matellew 
Prosecutorr BARTON, JENNIFER 
Defendant^ 
Defendants AttOCTeyjKLs KOTTLER, DAVID_S 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: November 16r 1955 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Jape Counts lOrlO 
CHARGES 
Y 7 T L L ~ E 1 S ^ 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition:~~06/2l/l999 Guilty Plea 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 \^l> 
Case^No^ 981923959 
Date:, Sep 13*, 1999 
SENTENCE FINE 
Total^Fine: $5000.00 
Total Suspended: $4250.00 
Total "Surcharge: $637:50 
TotalZPrincipal.Due: $1387.50 
JPlus Interest 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney"Fees: Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is^placed^on probation for 36 month(s) 
r^pbaubj^ on is to^be^supervised by Adult Probation* &':Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a~ f ine of 1387 T50 wher¥~theHsu^ been 
added to the fine. Interest may increase the-final-amount due. 
Pay fine to The Court. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any 
LawxEnforcement Officer. 
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor 
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law 
Enforcement Officer. 
Violate no laws. 
Submit to drug testing. 
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise 
Page 2 
ITNM 
Case^Nui i98192a95g 
dis t r ibutee! i l l ^ g a - Q 
Mil^?i*£S^J^;use ^ f £alcoholic4beverages . 
P* i i^^P2^ , i^JJ%te xn, ^and ^complete ,an ,xn-;patient
 4drug/alcohol 
p i03iam,ana J com^ l e t e a n y Aftercare^s.recommended by Adult 
Probation and P ^ r o i V 
FullJ%tim^emplo m^e--nt ^ (af t erltYeatment program) N o
 P^escriPtlon^"{controlled "substances) "without Adult Probation 
and Parole's ag^ e e m e n t 
Dated this /J^day o f 
DENNIS M 
District* 
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